Christopher Gadsden
Christopher Gadsden was a South Carolina scholar and a prominent figure during the American Revolution. He was born in Charleston, South Carolina, but sent to England for his education. Gadsden was known for his major opposition to the Stamp Act, which would allow Britain to prophet on every piece of paper sold in the colonies. Gadsden wrote a series of letters to the South Carolina Gazette, the most widely read news paper in South Carolina at the time, proclaiming his disdain for the manner in which Colonel James Grant ended the Anglo-Cherokee wars. The origins of the conflict in South Carolina stem from Cherokee warriors stealing horses, which lead to a series of murders among which were Cherokees killing the commander at Fort Prince George and subsequently the militants of Fort Prince George massacring the Cherokee hostages within.
In 1762 Peter Timothy published Christopher Gadsden’s “Some Obersations on the Two Campaigns Against the Cherokee Indians, in 1760 and 1761. In a second letter from Philoptrios.” The pamphlet was a serious of arguments demeaning Colonel Grant’s methods of assault against the Cherokee Indians. Much of the writing comes from Gadsden’s letters sent to the South Carolina Gazette, which would have been widely read by the settlers of South Carolina. Philopatrios means “lover of homeland” but interestingly it is not clear whether Gadsden is referring to England or to South Carolina. Gadsden exhibits extreme patriotism in the sense that Gadsden criticizes Grant for not killing more Cherokee warriors. Since Grant failed to further decimate the Cherokee population Gadsden believes South Carolina militants unnecessarily lost their lives.
James Grant
In the pamphlet Gadsden also blamed Grant for failure of Montegomery campaign, which took place a year before Grant’s. Despite the fact that was a subordinate of Montgomery’s, Gadsden’s criticism of that initial campaign lies largely on Grant. Though Grant destroyed thousands of acres of Cherokee farm land in his initial assaults, Gadsden found fault in his lack of pursuit of the Cherokee. Gadsden felt a more proactive approach to the war would end it sooner and save more lives. It is important to consider that though Gadsden was an important scholar, he was not a Colonel in the army like Grant was, but some of his claims certainly may hold true.
The flag that Gadsden would later design during the American revolution shows a rattlesnake with the words, “don’t tread on me,” certainly relates to Gadsden’s personality and his outspoken nature. His pamphlet demonstrates a relentless assault on Grant without much consideration for his accomplishments. It’s also interesting to see the deep patriotism both parties have, yet each end up on opposites sides of the American revolution.
Passages from Gadsden’s pamphlet:
…in a known miserable starving condition, as appeared from a letter, in the weekly gazette, from that garrison, by the experts that passed through the camp when at the Ninety-Six, with dispatches dated from thence the 17th of May at which time they, after “having bartered away every ting, even their shirts and blankets, yet had not five weeks provision left.” Ought not every motive of honour, generosity and humanity too, to have concurred to excite a speedy endeavor to relieve those forlon people, even if col. Grant had not declared the nation to be “in his power” but as he did, what could be his motive to hesitate? Was there a moment to spare? Is it usual, when a garrison is reduced to the last extremity, to desist from taking all advantages of an enemy, especially savage one, when not only our friends liberties, but their lives too were known to be at stake? Why then were three weeks suffered unfeelingly to be trifled away at Keehowee, for runners to go backwards and forwards upwards of 300 miles, by that means give some of the Rangers time and occasion to cool, be disfigured and desert; our friendly Indians to leave us; and the Cherokees an opportunity to recover their spirits and despite us, to steal our horses, and collect themselves together by calling in their hunters and, above all, to risk the lives of above 200 fellow subjects at Fort Loudoun, then looked upon by the Indians as their certain prey when, by col. Grant’s largest accounts, we had but 40 Indian prisoners, and all them, excepting two of three, women and children (and the women they are known to regard very little) to insure our 200. Could it be though the Cherokee were such fuels, to let slip so fine and critical an opportunity of imposing upon us, given them by the colonel, and to make so stupid an exchange give up the means of glutting their passion, revenge, and reduce us besides to what terms they almost pleased, then so evidently, for the sake of that garrison just falling with it into their own? Are not these natural and obvious arguments that must be supposed to occur at the time and if just, where then was the least shadow of reason, to support that most improbable preposterous “daresay” the cause of so many and such lasting disgraces. [14-15]
How will the colonel clear the following passage of a glaring contradiction, not to save imposition? “Tis really unlucky, that a peace could not be brought about. We have succeeded in everything we have attempted” Was not this peace attempted? What else made him halt three shameful weeks at Keehowee, before he marched?
Let us now proceed to make some remarks on the second campaign, in 1761 ; in order, amongst other things, to discover, if the first was of any, and what use, to the second, as a matter of mere experience.
Here, Sir, I must acknowledge myself extremely puzzled, to find out any improvement made in the second, upon the first campaign, notwithstanding the colonel was so many months appointed to the command before he took the field. The marches were certainly much more slow and tedious now than before, and excepting that pack of horses were divided into brigades, and there severally interspersed, and guarded by the different corps, a general sameness apparently runs through both. . . And nothing can more evidently demonstrate, that the colonel’s chief dependence, from the very beginning, was, on the known cowardice of the Indians, than his setting out with this order of march; for had they suddenly and vigorously attacked any one corps, might not that have been cut to pieces before the next saw its danger, or if it did, could have come to its assistance in time, when itself was so encumbered with two or three brigades of provision horses.
[pg. 40]